嘉宾简介：
李海洋，莱斯大学琼斯商学院创新与战略管理教授、战略与环境组协调人。他在中国人民大学获得经济学学士和硕士学位，并在香港城市大学获得博士学位。在加入莱斯大学之前，他曾在德克萨斯农工大学管理系和香港岭南大学任教，担任《管理学季刊》联合创始主编。研究兴趣主要集中在技术创业与创新、战略联盟与新兴市场的跨国公司创新，以及中国技术群的发展。目前已在Academy of Management Journal、Strategic Management Journal、Journal of Marketing、Organization Science、Strategic Entrepreneurship Journal、Journal of International Business Studies等期刊发表论文。
讲座简介：
Innovation platforms increasingly extend their control beyond core architectures by acquiring third?party enabling technologies (e.g., engines, SDKs, and middleware) that were previously independent and cross?platform. We conceptualize such acquisitions as a form of governance through infrastructure, whereby platform owners indirectly govern complementors by owning and integrating the shared tools that underlie ecosystem innovation. We propose that this infrastructural control reconfigures complementors’ dependence structure along two dimensions: technology dependence on the acquired enabling technology and platform dependence on the acquiring platform. Using developer-level data from the video game console industry (2010–2020), we use Microsoft’s 2015 acquisition of the Havok physics engine as a quasi?experimental shock to study how technology acquisitions shape complementors’ platform and multihoming decisions. We find that developers with higher pre?acquisition dependence on Havok become more likely to introduce games on Microsoft after the acquisition, consistent with integration and coordination benefits. However, when complementors are simultaneously highly dependent on Havok and on Microsoft, the acquisition discourages further deepening of their commitment to Microsoft and instead induces greater multihoming across rival platforms, reflecting heightened concerns about lock?in and uncertainty. Our findings advance platform governance research by introducing governance through infrastructure and show how vertical acquisitions reorganize innovation pathways across ecosystems.
